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SUBJECT: PRT-WASIT: GOI'S PROVINCIAL TRIBAL LIAISON MAKES
RECOMENDATIONS REGARDING WASIT SECURITY SITUATION

Classified By: PRT Wasit Team Leader Wade Weems for reasons 1.4 (b) and
(d).

¶1. (S/NF) Summary. On 10 August FOB Delta Commander and embedded Provincial Reconstruction Team (ePRT) Iraq Provincial Action Officer (IPAO) met with LTC Falih Hassan Nasir (protect), head of office for the Wasit Directorate of Tribal Affairs. LTC Falih gave his reasons for the security problems in the province - an ineffective police chief and force, Iranian and Sadrist militia influence and poor economic conditions. He said a CF plan to engage the Province tribes on security issues would be welcomed by the sheikhs and had potential to be effective. End summary.

¶2. (SBU) LTC Falih, a former Al Kut police officer, has three officers and five IPs under him in the Directorate for Tribal Affairs. He has offices in the Governor's building but reports to the Ministry of Interior (MoI). Falih said his office, the sole GOI authority on tribal issues in the province, registers details of all the tribes in Wasit. He noted that most of the districts and sub-districts in Wasit were controlled by tribes.

¶3. (SBU) Falih encouraged CF to engage the sheikhs on security, and recommended a strategy of meeting small groups of key sheikhs from a specific area. He identified two Princes and eleven key sheikhs in Wasit and offered to assist CDR 214th Fires BDE and ePRT with arranging the meetings.

¶4. (S/NF) Falih noted that one of the reasons security conditions in Al Kut are bad is because there is no role for the sheikhs and tribes. Improvements could be made in the IPs if sheikhs nominated tribesmen to serve, thus, introducing some accountability into the institution. IP leadership could approach the appropriate sheikh when an individual IP was a problem and have the issues resolved at the tribal level. He said the idea of incorporating the tribes had been brought up before but PM Maliki rejected it as he felt Wasit was stable and didn't need the arrangement.

¶5. (S/NF) When asked about the next Wasit police chief, Falih said that the interested candidates had until 26 August to nominate themselves, the Provincial Council will review the candidates and send three names to the Minister of Interior for a decision. When pressed on a good candidate, Falih said MG Abd Al Haninn Hamud Faysal Al Amir, currently at MOI would be strong and effective. (Note: Haninn was given the post during the period of the CPA's administration of Wasit. Past reporting in other channels indicates he was an effective chief who was known to aggressively enforce the law in a relatively impartial manner. He was relieved in 2005 after an ISCI-Badr influenced PC was elected. End note.)

¶6. (S/NF) Comment. The first meeting with Falih was encouraging; he was direct and concise in his answers. He said the right things regarding rule of law and seemed

unusually frank for a first meeting. We plan to meet with him again and utilize him as part of our tribal engagement strategy. Additionally, after some cursory research, we agree that MG Haninn would be the best candidate for the Wasit Police Chief job - an assessment shared by our US military colleagues. End comment.
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